Public-interest litigation relaxes the traditional rules of standing, but it also places an unusually high burden of candour on the person invoking it. In Ajay Bhaik v. State of Himachal Pradesh, the Himachal Pradesh High Court found that this burden had not been met—and forfeited the petitioner’s deposit of ₹2 lakh.
The judgment, reported as 2026:HHC:30055, was delivered on 20 July 2026 by Chief Justice G.S. Sandhawalia and Justice Bipin Chander Negi. On the same day, the Bench dismissed another PIL concerning the alignment of a village road after finding that technical opinion and possible private interest stood in the petitioner’s way.
Read together, the two decisions explain what the Court expects before allowing a person to litigate in the name of the public.
The dispute over the Cooperative Bank’s software
The first case concerned the decision of the Himachal Pradesh State Cooperative Bank to adopt Finacle 10.2.25 as its core-banking software.
The petitioner questioned the absence of a separate open tender by the Bank. He sought an independent inquiry into the procurement process and directions requiring future procurements to be undertaken through transparent and product-neutral competitive bidding.
Because the dispute concerned a commercial procurement, the Court had earlier directed the petitioner to deposit ₹2 lakh with the Registry to demonstrate his bona fides.
What the petitioner argued
The petitioner alleged that the software contract, stated by him to be worth more than ₹45 crore, had been awarded to Dynacons Systems and Solutions Limited without following the prescribed procurement procedure.
His principal contention was that the Bank could not simply adopt a procurement exercise undertaken by the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development. According to him:
- the Bank was not a participant or beneficiary in NABARD’s request for proposals;
- the applicable financial rules, store-purchase instructions and GeM-related directions required a transparent procurement exercise;
- only limited vendors had been invited to demonstrate their products; and
- the Bank’s decision to proceed with Finacle without floating its own request for proposals was arbitrary.
The petitioner relied upon Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651, concerning judicial review of contractual and administrative decisions, and A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150, to submit that administrative decisions producing civil consequences must meet standards of fairness and transparency.
How the Bank answered the allegations
The Bank did not confine its defence to the merits of the procurement. It questioned the bona fides of the PIL itself.
It pointed out that information obtained under the Right to Information Act had originally been supplied to a Delhi-based advocate. The same material had allegedly appeared in an earlier petition filed before the Delhi High Court by Natural Support Consultancy Services Private Limited.
That earlier petition challenged NABARD’s pan-India procurement exercise and included the Himachal Pradesh State Cooperative Bank as a respondent. It was withdrawn on 8 July 2025. The PIL before the Himachal Pradesh High Court was filed three days later, on 11 July 2025.
The Bank argued that the petitioner had not satisfactorily explained how he obtained those documents. It alleged that he had no independent grievance and was acting at the instance of others.
On the merits, the Bank maintained that the transition was part of a regulatory and technology-modernisation exercise for cooperative banks. It relied on:
- adverse observations made by the Reserve Bank of India concerning the Bank’s existing BancMate system;
- NABARD’s communication dated 9 August 2022 asking the Bank to align its policy with the proposed national core-banking platform;
- the competitive process already conducted under NABARD’s supervision; and
- the assertion that Dynacons was the selected system integrator and not a subsidiary of Infosys, as alleged by the petitioner.
The Bank also contended that grievances concerning its functioning could not be pursued through a PIL while bypassing the remedies available under the cooperative-societies framework and the Bank’s bye-laws.
Why the Court refused to examine the tender challenge
The Court considered the petitioner’s bona fides before entering into the legality of the procurement.
It found the timing and similarity of the Delhi and Himachal proceedings significant. The Court was also dissatisfied with the explanation concerning the petitioner’s source of information. It concluded that the litigation was not genuine and appeared to be an attempt to derail the core-banking system being installed under NABARD’s national initiative.
Once the Court reached that conclusion, it held that the principles governing judicial review in Tata Cellular could not assist the petitioner.
The Court also referred to the Himachal Pradesh High Court (Public Interest Litigation) Rules, 2021. These rules require a petitioner to disclose that the litigation is not guided by personal gain or the gain of another person or institution. They also require disclosure of the source of the petitioner’s knowledge and the inquiries undertaken to verify the allegations.
The Court found those requirements particularly relevant because the documents relied upon had not originally been supplied to the petitioner.
Precedents relied upon by the Court
The judgment draws upon the Supreme Court’s established jurisprudence against misuse of PIL jurisdiction.
In Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305, the Supreme Court explained that PIL jurisdiction exists to protect a public, class or community interest and should not be used to vindicate a personal grievance.
The Court also referred to Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. Abdulbhai, (1976) 3 SCC 832, while tracing the development of representative standing in public-law proceedings.
In Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal, (2004) 3 SCC 349, the Supreme Court described PIL as a legal instrument that must be used with care and circumspection. Petitions motivated by personal gain, private profit, political considerations or publicity must be screened out, with exemplary costs imposed where appropriate.
The Court placed further reliance on State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal, (2010) 3 SCC 402. That decision requires courts to verify the petitioner’s credentials, examine the correctness of the petition’s contents and ensure that genuine public injury—rather than an ulterior motive—is involved.
Finally, the Court referred to Tehseen Poonawalla v. Union of India, (2018) 6 SCC 72, for the distinction between genuine representative standing and proceedings influenced by business rivalry.
Applying these authorities, the Bench dismissed the PIL and forfeited the ₹2 lakh deposited with the Registry. It directed that ₹1 lakh be transferred to the High Court Employees’ Welfare Association Fund and ₹1 lakh to the fund for poor patients at the Indira Gandhi Medical College.
The companion decision on road alignment
In Indima Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026:HHC:30057, the petitioner challenged the decision to alter the alignment of a link or ambulance road from Jiskoon to Matyantu. She wanted the road constructed through the earlier alignment via Shalawan Khad.
The petitioner relied on an earlier joint-inspection report and stated that residents had gifted land for the proposed road without claiming compensation.
The State responded that the earlier alignment was environmentally, technically and financially unsuitable. It stated that the old route passed through unstable terrain affected by slope movement, soil loosening and progressive sinking during the monsoons of 2023 and 2025.
According to the State, the new alignment:
- was approximately 600 metres shorter;
- involved less forest land and the cutting of fewer trees;
- passed through comparatively stable terrain; and
- provided access to a senior secondary school, health centre, Panchayat Ghar, temples and inhabited areas.
The Court accepted that the alignment had been selected after a joint technical assessment by officials of the Public Works, Forest and Revenue Departments. It also noticed circumstances suggesting that the proceedings might have been influenced by the location of the petitioner’s private land.
The petition was dismissed on two connected principles: a PIL cannot contain an element of private interest, and a constitutional court should not substitute its view for that of technical experts without a demonstrated legal infirmity.
No specific precedent was cited in this shorter judgment. The Court applied what it described as settled principles concerning private interest in PILs and judicial restraint in matters involving expert opinion.
What these decisions really say
The judgments do not insulate public procurement or infrastructure decisions from judicial review. A procurement decision can still be questioned for illegality, arbitrariness or mala fides, just as an expert decision can be challenged where relevant considerations have been ignored.
But before the Court examines those issues in a PIL, the petitioner must cross a credibility threshold.
Who supplied the documents? How were the allegations verified? Does the petitioner have a personal or commercial connection with the dispute? Has an earlier proceeding involving the same material been disclosed?
In public-interest litigation, those are not peripheral questions. They may determine whether the Court reaches the merits at all.
Official judgments
#HimachalHighCourt #PublicInterestLitigation #PIL #JudicialReview #RuleOfLaw #IndianJudiciary