An admitted encroachment upon government land by a father-in-law resulted in rejection of his daughter-in-law’s nomination for a Panchayat election. She maintained that she lived separately from her in-laws and challenged the Ordinance that extended the statutory disqualification to daughters-in-law. In Khursheeda v. State of Himachal Pradesh, the Himachal Pradesh High Court upheld the amendment, raising important questions about ordinance-making, electoral integrity and constitutional equality.
Case: Khursheeda v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others; CWP No. 7359 of 2026; neutral citation 2026:HHC:47550; reserved 27 October 2026; decided 30 October 2026. Bench: Justice Ajay Mohan Goel and Justice Yogesh Jaswal. Judgment authored by Justice Ajay Mohan Goel. Writ petition dismissed; approved for reporting.
Primary source: Original Himachal Pradesh High Court judgment (22 pages) | LawUmbrella archival PDF.
The judgment concerns three distinct propositions: whether the Governor could promulgate an Ordinance under Article 213 after the Panchayat election programme was notified; whether an encroachment-related disqualification could lawfully extend to daughters-in-law; and whether the rejection of a nomination was to be addressed through the statutory election-petition mechanism. The Division Bench rejected the challenge on the record before it. Its reasoning merits attention both for what it decides and for the limits of its precedential reach.
The land encroachment, the election and the change in law
Khursheeda proposed to contest for the office of Pradhan of Gram Panchayat Sanwal in District Chamba. The State Election Commission notified the Panchayati Raj election programme on 29 April 2026. The scheduled nomination dates were 7, 8 and 11 May; scrutiny was to begin on 12 May, with the list of contesting candidates to be finalised on 15 May.
The Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act, 2026 (Act No. 12 of 2026), assented to on 4 May and published on 5 May, substituted Section 122 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. Under Section 122(1)(e), encroachment by a candidate or a specified family member upon designated public land attracted disqualification from being chosen as a Panchayat member, subject to the provision concerning six years from eviction or cessation of encroachment. Section 122(2)(d) contained the corresponding office-bearer provision.
The original explanation referred to grandparents, parents, spouse, son and unmarried daughter within the defined family category. A daughter-in-law was not included. On 6 May 2026, the Governor promulgated the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Ordinance, 2026 (Ordinance No. 1 of 2026), inserting “daughter-in-law” into the explanations to both Section 122(1)(e) and Section 122(2)(d). The Ordinance therefore extended an existing encroachment-based disqualification; it did not originate the entire scheme.
Khursheeda filed her nomination on 8 May 2026. Her father-in-law, Gani Mohammad, was admittedly in unauthorised occupation of government land since 1980. She stated that he had applied for regularisation, without a decision on that application for over 24 years, and that she lived separately with her husband and children. Her candidature was rejected under the amended provision. She then challenged the Ordinance, its timing and its constitutional justification.
Judgment: paragraphs 1–5 and 13.
What the High Court held
The Division Bench identified the central question as whether promulgation of the Ordinance was a mala fide or colourable exercise of Article 213 power, or otherwise contrary to its constitutional requirements. The Bench found that the Legislative Assembly was not in session, that the impending nomination and scrutiny timetable called for immediate action in the State’s assessment, and that no substantiated oblique purpose or fraud on power was demonstrated.
The Court further held that adding daughters-in-law to the disqualification was neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. Its principal explanation was the need to prevent persons disqualified by encroachment from circumventing the restriction by putting forward daughters-in-law as candidates. Because the father-in-law’s encroachment was not disputed, the Bench also found no illegality in rejection of Khursheeda’s nomination. It observed that an election petition was the appropriate remedy against such rejection.
Judgment: paragraphs 14–25.
Article 213: a conditional legislative power, not an unrestricted alternative to legislation
Article 213 permits the Governor to promulgate an Ordinance while the Legislature is not in session, if satisfied that circumstances exist rendering immediate action necessary. The Ordinance has the force and effect of an Act, subject to constitutional limits, including the requirement of placing it before the Legislature and the provisions governing cessation of its operation.
The seven-judge Supreme Court decision in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2017) 3 SCC 1, is the controlling authority. It recognises that satisfaction under Articles 123 and 213 is not wholly immune from judicial review: relevant material, extraneous purposes and fraud on constitutional power may be examined. But the reviewing court does not replace the constitutional authority’s assessment of the adequacy or sufficiency of the material with its own. Interference is confined to the exceptional grounds recognised by the decision.
The High Court expressly relied on Krishna Kumar Singh. In its view, the approaching election deadline and the Assembly not being in session explained why the State considered inclusion of daughters-in-law necessary before the final candidate list was issued. It therefore found compliance with Article 213.
Necessity for immediate action and the election timetable
The chronology nevertheless warrants careful distinction. Act No. 12 of 2026 received assent on 4 May; the Ordinance followed on 6 May; the election programme had been notified on 29 April. The imminent elections were certainly relevant to the Government’s asserted urgency. Yet the policy desirability of an amendment and the constitutional requirement of circumstances making immediate action necessary are analytically separate.
The written judgment explains the urgency principally by the election timetable and the legislative recess. It does not extensively discuss the contemporaneous materials underlying the Governor’s satisfaction or why the omission was identified so soon after the preceding amending Act. That is a limitation of the reasons disclosed in the judgment, not a finding that relevant material did not exist. Under Krishna Kumar Singh, a court may review constitutional legality without sitting in appeal over sufficiency of relevant material.
The satisfaction of the Governor and the proper scope of review
Paragraph 12 of the judgment uses broad language suggesting that gubernatorial satisfaction itself is not amenable to judicial review, while the reasons leading to it are. Paragraph 15, however, states the narrower and binding formulation from Krishna Kumar Singh: satisfaction is not immune from judicial review, although the power of scrutiny is limited. The latter formulation governs. Read as a whole, the Division Bench proceeded to determine whether there was any established abuse or extraneous purpose, and answered that question in the negative.
Mala fides, political motive and colourable exercise of power
Khursheeda alleged that the Ordinance was rushed through after announcement of elections to obtain political or collateral advantage. The State denied that allegation and maintained that the amendment pursued the public objective of preventing circumvention of an encroachment-based restriction.
The Bench found no sufficient material showing that the Ordinance had been promulgated to exclude a particular candidate, favour someone else, or achieve an oblique purpose. The timing of a law may form part of the evidentiary assessment, but timing alone does not establish fraud on constitutional power. A challenge alleging such abuse requires material capable of supporting the inference; the petitioner had not established it on the record before the Court.
In paragraph 16, the Bench contrasted the present expansion of the disqualification with a hypothetical relaxation of an earlier restriction. That observation belongs to its discussion of alleged improper purpose. It should not be elevated into a rule that expanding electoral disqualifications is constitutionally safer than relaxing them. Either legislative choice remains subject to constitutional limits.
Judgment: paragraphs 15–16 and 22.
Article 243F: legislative competence is not the end of Article 14 scrutiny
Article 243F(1)(b) expressly authorises State law to prescribe disqualifications for Panchayat membership. In Rajbala v. State of Haryana, (2016) 2 SCC 445, the Supreme Court recognised substantial legislative latitude in prescribing eligibility and disqualification conditions for local self-government institutions, while subjecting the legislation to constitutional review. Read the Supreme Court judgment.
The State may legitimately protect public land, discourage unlawful encroachment and prescribe standards for persons seeking elected office. Where a candidate has personally encroached on public property, the relationship between that conduct and the legislative purpose is direct. More difficult questions arise when an individual attracts disqualification because a specified relative committed the encroachment.
The two inquiries must remain distinct: Article 243F establishes competence to prescribe disqualifications; Article 14 regulates the constitutional permissibility of the classification selected. Legislative power does not render every exercise of that power automatically valid.
Does kinship justify disqualification? The daughter-in-law and proxy candidature
The High Court accepted the State’s concern that disqualified encroachers might evade the restriction by putting forward relatives who fell outside the statutory family definition. In paragraph 25, it explained why exclusion of daughters-in-law could allow such circumvention, including in seats reserved for women. The objective of preventing proxy candidature is a legitimate concern for electoral integrity.
The constitutional issue lies in the relationship between that objective and the persons included within the statutory rule. A daughter-in-law might reside with an encroacher, benefit from the occupied land or participate in family decisions concerning it. She might equally maintain a separate household, have no interest in the land and act independently in politics. The May Ordinance operated through the specified family relationship and the underlying encroachment; it was not framed as a requirement for the Returning Officer to prove personal participation in each case.
Khursheeda expressly pleaded separate residence. The Court nevertheless found that the statutory provision applied, given the admitted encroachment by her father-in-law. It did not make a factual finding that Khursheeda personally benefited from the land or acted as a proxy for him. A legislature’s general concern about proxy candidates must not be confused with a judicial determination that a particular candidate is a proxy.
The Article 14 inquiry remains concerned with the relationship between the law’s purpose and the classification it uses. A family-based restriction may be defended as necessary to prevent evasion and avoid difficult inquiries into private arrangements. Conversely, its breadth may generate an objection where persons unconnected with the encroachment are automatically subjected to electoral consequences. Such a possibility does not, without more, establish unconstitutionality.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar, 2026 INSC 219, is an additional reference for the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness in review of primary legislation. It arises in a different statutory context; it does not decide the validity of the Himachal amendment. Original Supreme Court judgment.
The Division Bench rejected the Article 14 challenge. The reasons given are more fully developed on the anti-circumvention objective than on the distinct circumstances of an independently residing daughter-in-law. That is a question for legal analysis, not a conclusion that the Court committed a reversible constitutional error.
Judgment: paragraphs 17–18 and 23–25.
The double-jeopardy objection and the meaning of family
The petitioner also argued that a woman could be disqualified both as a daughter and as a daughter-in-law. The Bench answered the argument by reference to the statute: the prior definition covered an unmarried daughter, not every married daughter within her parental family. The extension to a daughter-in-law operated through a different specified relationship. Moreover, the constitutional protection in Article 20(2) concerns repeated prosecution and punishment for the same offence, not merely the adverse consequence of electoral ineligibility. The more substantial question is equality under Article 14 rather than double jeopardy.
Lawful application still requires attention to procedural safeguards
The substituted Section 122 included a mechanism for determining disqualification, including an opportunity of being heard under subsection (4). The validity of the governing provision and the legality of its application in an individual nomination dispute are separate matters. The competent authority must determine the statutory disqualification in accordance with the operative text and the procedure prescribed by law.
In Khursheeda, the encroachment by the father-in-law was not disputed. The judgment does not undertake a detailed examination of the nomination-scrutiny record or decide a disputed question about whether that encroachment had occurred. Consequently, its holding should not be construed as dispensing with the statutory hearing requirement in other cases.
The September 2026 replacement Bill and the term ‘beneficiary’
The legislative sequence did not end with the May Ordinance. The Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (2nd Amendment) Bill, 2026 (Bill No. 11 of 2026), as introduced on 1 September 2026, proposed substituting the relevant clauses with language covering a person who had encroached upon specified public land or was a “beneficiary of the encroachment”. Its explanation included a daughter-in-law among specified relatives. The proposal also referred to village common land, retrospective commencement from 6 May 2026, and repeal-and-savings provisions for the Ordinance.
The Legislative Assembly was reported to have passed the Bill on 3 September 2026, and the High Court recorded the State’s submission that the amendment had subsequently been passed and formed part of the Act. The final assented and gazetted text has not been independently established for this analysis; accordingly, the introduced Bill is described as a legislative proposal rather than conclusively as the operative wording of the enacted replacement law.
The proposed terminology raises a separate interpretative question: must an individual benefit from encroachment be proved, or does the explanation include specified relatives within “beneficiary” by legislative definition? That question cannot be resolved merely from the word “beneficiary” in isolation. The precise enacted text and its explanation require construction together. The May Ordinance’s family-member formulation and the September Bill’s beneficiary formulation should not be treated as textually identical.
The Division Bench primarily adjudicated the constitutional challenge to the May Ordinance. The judgment should not be cited as a detailed interpretation of every provision proposed in the subsequent Bill.
Rejection of nomination, Article 243-O and the election-petition remedy
The Ordinance took effect on 6 May 2026, before Khursheeda filed her nomination. With her father-in-law’s encroachment admitted, the Bench found no illegality in the application of the May provision to her candidature. In paragraph 21, it also observed that an election petition was the appropriate course for challenging rejection of nomination.
Article 243-O(b) channels challenges to Panchayat elections through an election petition presented in accordance with State law. In Sandeep Singh Bora v. Narendra Singh Deopa, 2026 INSC 105, the Supreme Court emphasised the constitutional restraints on judicial intervention in ongoing Panchayat elections and the importance of the prescribed election-dispute mechanism. Original Supreme Court judgment.
An individual dispute over a Returning Officer’s application of an otherwise valid statute is conceptually distinct from a challenge to the constitutionality of that statute. The timing and form of relief nevertheless remain subject to the constitutional election-law framework. In Khursheeda, the High Court considered the constitutional challenge on its merits and rejected it; its observation on the election-petition remedy should therefore not be read as abolishing constitutional judicial review of electoral legislation.
Judgment: paragraphs 20–21.
The ratio and the limits of the decision
The operative conclusion is that the 6 May Ordinance satisfied Article 213 on the grounds considered, that fraud on power and mala fides had not been substantiated, and that inclusion of a daughter-in-law within the specified encroachment-related disqualification was not arbitrary or discriminatory. The petitioner’s nomination was validly rejected on the admitted facts recorded by the Bench. The writ petition was dismissed.
The ruling does not establish that gubernatorial satisfaction is beyond review, that every conceivable family-linked electoral restriction satisfies Article 14, that Khursheeda was in fact a proxy candidate, or that the proposed beneficiary-based wording of a later statute has already received a detailed judicial construction. Its precedential force must be understood in the context of the challenged Ordinance and the controlling Supreme Court authorities.
Conclusion: electoral integrity and individual eligibility
Khursheeda affirms the State’s authority to extend encroachment-related electoral disqualifications to daughters-in-law and upholds the use of Article 213 power in the circumstances before the Court. It accepts prevention of circumvention of electoral restrictions as a legitimate legislative purpose and rejects the attempt to invalidate the Ordinance on unsubstantiated allegations of improper motive.
Yet the validity of an important public purpose and the constitutional validity of the means adopted remain distinct legal questions. Article 243F confers legislative competence; Article 14 continues to impose constitutional limitations on the categories of persons who may be denied eligibility for elected office. The judgment resolves the particular controversy in favour of the State, while illustrating the continuing significance of the relationship between family status, conduct attributable to another person and individual participation in democratic institutions.
Primary sources and authorities
High Court: Khursheeda v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others, CWP No. 7359 of 2026, 2026:HHC:47550, decided 30 October 2026. Official judgment | LawUmbrella archive.
Legislation: Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act, 2026 (Act No. 12 of 2026); Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Ordinance, 2026 (Ordinance No. 1 of 2026); Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (2nd Amendment) Bill, 2026, as introduced.
Supreme Court: Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2017) 3 SCC 1 (Article 213); Rajbala v. State of Haryana, (2016) 2 SCC 445 (Article 243F); Sandeep Singh Bora v. Narendra Singh Deopa, 2026 INSC 105 (Article 243-O); Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar, 2026 INSC 219 (Article 14). The additional cases provide analytical context and were not all expressly discussed by the High Court.
Related LawUmbrella coverage: Himachal Law Journal — week ending 8 November 2026.
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