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In the tapestry of legal history, there are moments that echo with resonance, revealing the courage of those who refuse to be silenced. Consider the words of Francis Bacon, who likened judges to “Lions under the throne,” guardians of justice and truth. Yet, as time unfurled its chapters, another narrative emerged. In the famous Second World War case of Liversidge v Anderson, where Lord Atkin delivered his powerful dissenting speech, he commented on the arguments of the lawyers and stated that this level of reasoning would have been acceptable to the Court of Kings Bench in the time of Charles I (a monarchy) but not in a democracy! sadly, this reasoning was accepted by all of his brother judges. The subjective interpretation adopted by his brother judges who were then pleasing to politicians provoked a letter to Lord Atkin from Mr Justice Wintringham Stable. The letter expressed approval of Lord Atkin’s dissent, and then added:

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In the Indian constitutional framework, the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary are the three organs of State power, each with clearly demarcated spheres of functioning. While Parliament and State Legislatures make laws, the Judiciary interprets and applies them. However, when a court strikes down a law or grants relief on the interpretation of a statute, can the Legislature intervene and undo the effect of such judgment?

This legal conundrum finds its answer in the principle of “changing the basis” of law—a nuanced doctrine that permits legislative override only when it alters the factual or legal substratum that formed the foundation of a court’s decision.

This article analyses the scope, limits, and constitutional boundaries of this principle through landmark judgments of the Supreme Court and the evolving jurisprudence on the separation of powers.

II. The Doctrine of “Changing the Basis” of Law: Meaning and Scope

The doctrine allows the Legislature to respond to judicial decisions by:

Removing the defect in the law identified by the court, and
Altering the legal or factual basis that led to the judicial decision.

Critically, the Legislature cannot simply declare a judgment void or incorrect—that would amount to exercising judicial power, which is impermissible.

As held in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality, (1969) 2 SCC 283:

“A court’s decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances.”

Thus, legislation that retrospectively changes the law’s basis can validly affect pending or future claims but cannot negate a final decision inter partes unless the altered law renders such relief untenable.

III. Judicial Clarifications: Key Cases and Detailed Analysis

1. Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality, (1969) 2 SCC 283

In this seminal case, the Municipality had levied a cess on the appellants, which was quashed by the High Court. The Legislature thereafter enacted a validation law making the cess retrospectively valid.

Held:
The Supreme Court upheld the legislation, stating that the Legislature could remove the defect retrospectively and validate levies. However, the Legislature cannot merely say that a judicial decision shall not bind.

Key takeaway: Legislative override is valid if it removes the basis of the judgment and does not directly invalidate the judicial outcome.

2. Indian Aluminium Co. v. State of Kerala, (1996) 7 SCC 637

The Kerala High Court struck down certain imposts. The State amended the Kerala Electricity Duty Act retrospectively.

Held:
The Supreme Court upheld the amendment, observing that the new legislation cured the defect identified by the Court and applied uniformly to all similarly situated parties.

3. Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, Re, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96

This Constitution Bench decision reiterated that while the Legislature may change the general basis of a judgment, it cannot nullify an individual adjudication.

“It is permissible to change the law retrospectively, thereby affecting future cases. But it is not permissible to legislate to reverse a judicial determination between specific parties.”

4. W.S.R. Bhagwat v. State of Mysore, (1995) 6 SCC 16

In W.S.R. Bhagwat v. State of Mysore, (1995) 6 SCC 16, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of legislative overreach and the supremacy of judicial decisions. The court struck down Section 11(2) of the impugned act, which attempted to nullify a final decision of the Karnataka High Court regarding employee seniority and promotions. The court also read down certain provisions of Section 4, ensuring that the State complied with the High Court’s earlier directions. This case is a landmark decision emphasizing the judiciary’s role in protecting fundamental rights and upholding the rule of law against legislative encroachment on judicial power.

Key Points:

Legislative Overreach:

The State of Mysore attempted to circumvent a final High Court judgment by enacting a law that effectively nullified the court’s decision on seniority and promotions for certain employees.
Judicial Supremacy:

The Supreme Court, in this case, reaffirmed the principle that legislative bodies cannot override final judicial decisions, especially those concerning fundamental rights and established legal principles.
Impact of the Decision:

The court’s decision in Bhagwat v. State of Mysore has significant implications for the separation of powers and the protection of individual rights. It reinforces the idea that judicial decisions, once final, must be respected and implemented by all branches of government.
Reading Down Provisions:

The court did not only strike down one section of the law but also read down other problematic provisions. This means the court interpreted those provisions in a way that aligned with constitutional principles and the High Court’s judgment.
Consequences for the State:

The State of Mysore was directed to comply with the High Court’s original directions, including providing consequential financial benefits to the affected employees.

5. State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala, (2014) 12 SCC 696

This Constitution Bench crystallized the limits of legislative override of judgments:

Legislature cannot render judgments void or ineffective;
It can, however, alter the statutory conditions upon which the judgment was based;
Separation of powers is part of the basic structure of the Constitution;
Judicial pronouncements cannot be annulled by legislative fiat.

This case has become the touchstone for analyzing legislative conduct post-judgment.

6. Cheviti Venkanna Yadav v. State of Telangana, (2017) 1 SCC 283

The case involved a challenge to the constitutional validity of a retrospective amendment to the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966. Originally, the Act stated that Chairmen, Vice-Chairmen, and members of the Agricultural Market Committees were “appointed” by the government for a term of three years. The Government of Telangana subsequently amended Section 5(3) of the Act, substituting the word “appointed” with “nominated” and also retrospectively reducing the tenure of these positions.

The High Court and Supreme Court’s findings

This amendment was challenged in the High Court, which found that the distinction between individuals appointed before and after the amendment to be unreasonable and in violation of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution (right to equality). However, the Supreme Court ultimately overturned this decision and upheld the constitutional validity of the retrospective amendment.

The Supreme Court emphasized that the term “appointed” in the original Act did not denote an appointment under service law. The Court clarified that the government had the authority to remove members of the market committees even prior to the expiry of their term. Furthermore, the Court noted that these members were not selected through an election process or formal selection procedures; rather, they were chosen by the government from specific categories.

7. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1990) 4 SCC 557

This decision upheld the validity of a law which sought to impose cess retrospectively. The Court noted that the Legislature had removed the infirmity, thus passing the test laid down in Prithvi Cotton Mills.

8. Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (1996) 7 SCC 637

This case is frequently cited as an illustration of how validation laws can remove the basis of a judgment and survive judicial scrutiny, provided they operate on a general class and not to nullify individual relief.

IV. Contemporary Applications and Examples

A. Vodafone Case and Retrospective Taxation

In Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 613, the Supreme Court held that capital gains tax did not apply to offshore indirect transfers. Parliament responded with retrospective amendments to Section 9 of the Income Tax Act.

The government later withdrew the demand in 2021, acknowledging the controversy, but it remains a powerful example of Parliament’s ability to change the basis of a ruling—even if politically unpopular.

B. Reservation Policies

Several State laws expanding reservation percentages were enacted after the Supreme Court’s ceiling in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217. Attempts to insert reservations beyond 50% through constitutional amendments (e.g., Maratha reservation and the 103rd Amendment) have tested the waters of judicial override via constitutional means, some of which are still under judicial scrutiny.

V. What Legislature Can and Cannot Do

Permissible	Impermissible
Change legal basis of a judgment	Declare a judgment void or wrong
Enact validation laws to cure defects	Legislate to reverse relief granted inter partes
Retrospective application to classes	Selective denial of benefit to litigants alone
Amend laws post-judgment with uniform applicability	Encroach into judicial functions by overruling findings

VI. Doctrine of Mandamus and Limits on Legislative Response

A mandamus issued by a High Court or Supreme Court is a judicial command enforceable under Article 226 or 32. The Legislature cannot nullify it by statute, unless the legal basis of the mandamus itself is changed. The Judiciary retains the power to enforce its directives against the State.

VII. Conclusion

The doctrine of changing the basis of law reflects a constitutional compromise between the supremacy of Parliament in legislative affairs and the independence of the Judiciary in interpreting laws.

It allows the Legislature to legitimately respond to judicial findings by curing defects, amending the legal landscape, and ensuring that law evolves. However, it draws a red line at judicial finality, which cannot be disturbed without offending the doctrine of separation of powers, a part of the basic structure of the Constitution.

The judicial decisions discussed above provide not only boundaries for legislative action but also guideposts for maintaining a harmonious constitutional balance.