Banwa Land Dispute: A Case Study of Property Rights, legitimacy of revenue records, and injunctions under CPC

The Banwa land dispute, adjudicated by Justice Sandeep Sharma of Himachal Pradesh High Court, offers a compelling insight into property rights and judicial processes in the State of H.P. The case, originating from a disagreement over land ownership in Village Banwa, Tehsil Arki, District Solan, progressed through various judicial phases, ultimately leading to a pivotal judgment. This report delves into the complexities of the case, unraveling the enduring impact of historical land records and the vital importance of timely legal action in land disputes. The plaintiffs’ failure to contest or correct the revenue records at crucial junctures significantly weakened their claim. This judgment cites precedents, explains the law of granting a temporary injunction, the scope of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and further reaffirms the legal tenet that mere possession or ancestral claims do not override well-documented and long-standing records unless adequately contested and legally rectified. Let’s dive right in!

Facts of the Case:

Plaintiffs claimed joint co-ownership of 291.10 ha of land in Banwa, challenging the revenue record entries favoring the defendants. They sought an injunction to prevent the defendants from altering the land’s nature.

Key Dates:

Original Suit Filed: 2009 (CS No. 162 of 2009)
Trial Court’s Order: 12.9.2011
Appellate Court’s Judgment: 23.4.2016
High Court’s Judgment: November 2, 2023

Arguments Presented:

The plaintiffs argued for recognition of their co-ownership and the illegality of the revenue records. Further, the plaintiff relied on the principle that the appellate court should be loathed in interfering with the orders passed by the learned trial court (Mahila Bajrangi v. Badribai, (2003) 2 SCC 464, Sushma Mehta v. Mehar Singh, 2013 (2) LHLJ 943, Vikram Singh Junior High School v. District Magistrate, (2002) 9 SCC 509, Daya Singh v. Gurdev Singh, (2010) 2 SCC 194, Mohinder Singh v. Kashmira Singh, AIR 1985 P&H 215, Baleshwar Tewari v. Sheo Jatan Tiwary, (1997) 5 SCC 112 : AIR 1997 SC 2089, Rajashthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation v. Subhash Sindhi coop. Housing Society, (2013) 5 SCC 427, Skyline Education Institute (India). S.L. Vaswani, (2010) 2 SCC 142, Fritco-Lay India v. Uncle Chipps Prviate Ltd., AIR 2000 Del 366.)

In contrast, the defendants maintained the correctness of the records, asserting sole ownership since 1925 and non-interference by plaintiffs during the 1962 consolidation operations. Further, the defendants relied on the proposition that the High Court, in the exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction, is not expected to convert itself to a court of appeal; rather, supervisory jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice would occasion. To substantiate the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the respondents-defendants placed reliance upon the various judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, (2022) 4 SCC 181, Pooja Mittal v. Rakesh Kumar SLP(C) No. 5228 of 2020 decided on 14.7.2020, Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675 : AIR 2003 SC 3044 and Chaman Lal v. Dropti Devi, 2021 (2) SLC 1145.

Court’s Reasoning:

The trial court initially granted a status quo on the land, which the appellate court later overturned. The High Court, examining under Article 227, found the appellate court’s decision justified, emphasizing that revenue records, while not conclusive of title, held significant evidentiary value. The plaintiffs’ failure to contest changes in land records and the consolidation proceedings weakened their case.

Citations & References

The case revolves around principles of land ownership, legitimacy of revenue records, and injunctions under CPC. Notably, the court referenced several landmark judgments:

Mahila Bajrangi v. Badribai, (2003) 2 SCC 464: Highlighting the non-conclusivity of revenue records in determining ownership, “Entries in the revenue record are not the source of the title.”
Sushma Mehta v. Mehar Singh, 2013 (2) LHLJ 943: Emphasizing on the evidentiary value of revenue records subject to rebuttal, “Revenue entries have an evidentiary value subject to rebuttal but do not confer title.”
Vikram Singh Junior High School v. District Magistrate, (2002) 9 SCC 509: Regarding the cautious approach in altering status quo in land disputes, “The appellate court should be loathe in interfering with the orders passed by the trial court in applications for grant of interim relief.”
Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation v. Subhash Sindhi Co-op. Housing Society, (2013) 5 SCC 427: On the weightage of revenue records, “Revenue entries are important but not decisive or conclusive in determining the rights of the parties.”

Final Judgment:

The High Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition, upholding the appellate court’s judgment. The dismissal hinged on the plaintiffs’ inability to provide substantial evidence, contradicting the longstanding entries in the revenue records.

Important Paragraphs of the Case

14. Needless to say, court while considering prayer for ad-interim injunction, if any, under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC is required to satisfy itself with three points i.e. 1.) Whether prima-facie case, if any, exists, in favour of the party seeking ad-interim injunction, 2.) Balance of convenience, if any, is in favour of the party seeking ad-interim injunction; or against the party whom injunction is sought; 3.) Whether irreparable loss and irreparable injury, if any, shall be caused to the party seeking injunction in the event of denial of prayer made for injunction or in the event of grant of injunction, injury, if any, shall be caused to the opposite party. On the top of everything, conduct of the party seeking ad-interim injunction is of great importance. In case, it is established that party seeking ad-interim injunction has not approached the court with clean hands and has attempted to hoodwink the court by misstating the facts, court may refuse to exercise discretionary power under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC.

15. While taking into consideration aforesaid three factors, which must co-exist, court considering prayer for injunction is also required to see whether comparative mischief or inconvenience is likely to arise from withholding the injunction will be greater than which is likely to arise from granting it. Besides above, learned trial court while disposing application seeking ad-interim injunction may also look into the merits of the case while referring to the pleadings, especially written statement. Apart from aforesaid well established parameters/ingredients, conduct of the party seeking injunction is also of utmost importance, as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in case Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. The Coca Cola Co., (1995) 5 SCC 545 : AIR 1995 SC 2372. In case a party seeking injunction fails to make out any of three ingredients, it would not be entitled to injunction. Phrases, “prima facie case”, “balance of convenience” and “irreparable loss”, have been beautifully interpreted/defined by Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. The Puna Municipal Corpn., (1995) 3 SCC 33 : JT (1995) 2 SC 504 relying upon its earlier judgment in case titled Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719 has held as under:—

“…the phrases “prima facie case”, “balance of convenience” and “irreparable loss” are not rhetoric phrases for incantation but words of width and elasticity, intended to meet myriad situations presented by men’s ingenuity in given facts and circumstances and should always be hedged with sound exercise of judicial discretion to meet the ends of justice. The court would be circumspect before granting the injunction and look to the conduct of the party, the probable injury to either party and whether the plaintiff could be adequately compensated if injunction is refused. The existence of prima fade right and infraction of the enjoyment of him property or the right is a condition forthe grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury but means only that the Injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The balance of convenience must be in favour of granting injunction. The court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the court considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. The court has to exercise discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit.”

16. In case titled Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd.’ case supra, it has been categorically held that while passing interim order of injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC, court besides taking into consideration three specific principles, i.e. “prima facie case”, “balance of convenience” and “irreparable loss”, must also take into consideration the conduct of the parties.

17. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Seema Arshad Zaheer v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, (2006) 5 SCC 282, has held as under:—

“29. The discretion of the court is exercised to grant a temporary injunction only when the following requirements are made out by the plaintiff : (i) existence of a prima facie case as pleaded, necessitating protection of plaintiff’s rights by issue of a temporary injunction; (ii) when the need for protection of plaintiff’s rights is compared with or weighed against the need for protection of defendant’s rights or likely infringement of defendant’s rights, the balance of convenience tilting in favour of plaintiff; and (iii) clear possibility of irreparable injury being caused to plaintiff if the temporary injunction is not granted. In addition, temporary injunction being an equitable relief, the discretion to grant such relief will be exercised only when the plaintiff’s conduct is free from blame and he approaches the court with clean hands.”

18. It can be safely inferred from aforesaid law laid down by this court that grant of temporary injunction is not to be claimed by a party as a matter of right nor can be denied by a court arbitrarily rather, discretion in this regard is to be exercised by a court on the basis of principles, as have been enunciated in the aforesaid judgment.
20. Having carefully perused judgments pressed into service by the learned Senior counsel representing the plaintiffs in support of his contention, this court is not persuaded to agree with the contention of the learned Senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff that court below erred while setting aside status quo order passed by the learned trial court. There cannot be any quarrel with the proposition of law laid down in the judgments pressed into service by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that rights of the parties are not adjudicated upon merely on the basis of revenue entries because same are not the source of title. No doubt rights of the parties are to be decided on the basis of title, but question of title cannot be ascertained in the proceedings under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, rather in those proceedings, court having taken note of the three important factors i.e. prima-facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience, is only required to see as to whether on the basis of pleadings as well as documentary evidence led on record, party seeking ad-interim injunction is able to establish on record that he/she is owner in possession of the suit property and person, against whom injunction is sought, has no right, title and being stranger, he is trying to disturb the rightful ownership and possession of the person seeking ad-interim injunction. In all the aforesaid judgments relied upon by the learned senior counsel, it has been held that continuance of wrong revenue entry in the revenue records in favour of the person cannot confer on him/her any right over the land, but as has been observed herein above, question with regard to wrong entry and entitlement of the suit land, if any, in favour of the plaintiffs, could not have been gone into by the court considering prayer for ad-interim injunction, rather such question can only be decided in main suit on the basis of pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record by the parties, Civil court while considering prayer for ad-interim injunction, if any, made under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC is required to see pleadings as well as documentary evidence to infer the prima-facie case, if any, in favour of the person seeking ad-interim injunction or against whom injunction is being sought. Since in the case at hand, plaintiffs failed to place on record any documentary evidence suggestive of the fact that revenue entries existing in favour of the defendants since 1924-1925, showing them to be owner in possession, were rectified/corrected by the revenue authority or same were corrected on the basis of possession after consolidation proceeding, learned trial court ought not have granted status quo order merely on the ground that wrong revenue entries have been laid challenge. To the contrary defendants while placing on record revenue record successfully proved on record that since 1924-1925 their predecessor-in-interest or thereafter they have been shown in possession of the suit land and till date, entries existing in their favour have not been interfered with by any revenue authorities.